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54 
WHAT BOTH HART AND FULLER GOT WRONG  
Oren Gross* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, waged in 1958 
over eighty pages of the Harvard Law Review, is one of the best 
known and most important jurisprudential debates of our time1  
Pitting the leading proponent of legal positivism against one of the 
staunchest advocates of natural law, it saw Professor Hart arguing 
that the concept of law was distinct and separate from the concept of 
morality and that the validity of a positive legal order did not depend 
on its conformity with moral dictates.2  Thus, “[a] law, which actually 
exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from 
the text, by which we regulate our approbation and disapprobation.”3  
For his part, Professor Fuller argued that legal validity depended on 
the internal morality of law, which a system of rules ought to meet if 
it were to be considered a legal system.  Any law that did not satisfy 
such threshold principles of legality could not be called “law” at all.4  
Nowhere has the schism between legal positivists and natural 
law scholars been more pronounced, more visible, and more critical 
than in their treatment of “wicked legal systems”5—the paradigmatic 
example of which was the legal system that existed under National 
Socialism.  In the aftermath of the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis 
during the Third Reich and particularly during World War II (“WWII” 
or “War”), the question of what to do about morally evil laws became 
the litmus test for any legal theory.  Whereas for Hart, “laws may be 
 
 *. Irving Younger Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. 
 1. H.L.A Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 593 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to 
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). 
 2. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 66–67 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 
1967). 
 3. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 184 (Isaiah 
Berlin et al. eds., 1954). 
4.   Fuller, supra note 1, at 652–61. 
 5.   See generally DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: 
PATHOLOGIES OF LEGALITY (2d ed. 2010) (discussing “wicked legal systems” that 
promote unethical agendas in light of natural law and legal positivism). 
2021]  55 
 
law but too evil to be obeyed,”6 for Fuller, morally repugnant laws 
were simply not law at all.7 
This Essay argues that while Hart and Fuller’s responses to the 
challenges presented by wicked legal systems in general, and the 
experiences pertaining to the Nazi “legal system” in particular, 
diverged sharply, both scholars were in agreement with respect to one 
crucial piece of legal history pertaining to the state of legal theory in 
pre-Third Reich Germany and its impact on Nazi law.  Yet, it is 
precisely with respect to that shared understanding that both 
theorists got it wrong.  Part II of this Essay demonstrates Hart and 
Fuller’s shared understanding of the state of legal theory in pre-WWII 
Germany, accepting that legal positivism was “practiced and 
preached”8 as the main legal theory before the Nazis’ seizure of power 
in Germany.  Part III challenges that shared understanding and 
argues that not only was legal positivism not the prevalent theory in 
Germany before the rise to power of Adolf Hitler, but that, in fact, the 
Nazis adopted a perverted version of natural law to support their 
actions.  
II.  DEFENSELESS LAWYERS 
As soon as WWII had ended, the charge was made that the 
majority of the German legal profession were positivists and that 
their unwillingness to inquire into the morality of law “led to an easy 
capture of the legal system by the Nazis and facilitated its 
modification to meet evil Nazi goals.”9  Positivism, the argument 
went, had not provided a basis on which to reject evil laws and 
immoral legal systems.  For the positivist, an evil legal system, such 
as that put forward by the Nazis, was still a valid legal system and a 
law, which was morally evil but that was procedurally appropriately 
promulgated, was still a valid law.10  For legal positivists, the charge 
that positivism promotes “obsequious quietism,”11 i.e., that positivism 
is “corrupting in practice, at its worst apt to weaken resistance to 
state tyranny or absolutism, and at its best apt to bring the law into 
disrespect,”12 is at least, if not more, damning than the charge that it 
was intellectually misleading.  
In Positivism and Fidelity to Law, Lon Fuller argues that “in the 
seventy-five years before the Nazi regime the positivistic philosophy 
 
 6. Hart, supra note 1, at 620. 
 7. Fuller, supra note 1, at 652–61. 
 8.  Id. at 658. 
 9. JAMES E. HERGET, CONTEMPORARY GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 2 (1996). 
10.  See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 33–34 (8th ed. 
2019). 
 11. Hart, supra note 1, at 598. 
 12. DYZENHAUS, supra note 5, at 16 (quoting Hart, supra note 1, at 595). 
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had achieved in Germany a standing such as it enjoyed in no other 
country.”13  In his essay, H.L.A. Hart comments that the passionate 
arguments from experience offered by individuals such as Gustav 
Radbruch, who argued that the German legal tradition of positivism 
and formalism facilitated Nazism, cannot be “read without 
sympathy.”14  Conceding that the distinction between law and morals 
“acquired a sinister character in Germany,”15 Hart goes on to suggest 
that, the German experience notwithstanding, “elsewhere . . . [the 
distinction between law and morals] went along with the most 
enlightened liberal attitudes,”16 and that the way to deal with morally 
evil laws was to introduce retrospective laws that would override 
their legal consequences, rather than hide the moral quandary that 
such instances invoke.17  In line with this approach, Hart rejects the 
post-WWII German courts’ resolution of the case of the Grudge 
Informer.18  In a 1949 decision, the German Court of Appeals had to 
decide whether a German woman ought to be punished for 
denouncing her husband to the Nazi authorities for insulting (and 
under Nazi law, illegal) comments he had made about Adolf Hitler.19  
The woman argued in her defense that her actions had been lawful 
under Nazi law that existed when she informed the authorities.20  The 
German Court of Appeals found the woman guilty of “deprivation of  
[] liberty,” holding that Nazi laws were “contrary to the sound 
conscience and sense of justice of all decent human beings.”21  Hart 
argued that rather than declaring the Nazi statutes null and void, it 
would have been better to enact a new statute after WWII, which 
would apply retrospectively to the informer’s case.22  He suggested 
that:  
[I]f the woman were [sic] to be punished it must be pursuant to 
the introduction of a frankly retrospective law and with a full 
consciousness of what was sacrificed in securing her 
punishment in this way.  Odious as retrospective criminal 
legislation and punishment may be, to have pursued it openly 
in this case would at least have had the merits of candour.  It 
 
 13. Fuller, supra note 1, at 658. 
 14. Hart, supra note 1, at 616–17. 
 15. Id. at 618. 
 16. Id. 
 17.  See id. at 619–20. 
 18.    See id. at 618–20 (suggesting an alternative approach of implementing a 
“retrospective law” in order to punish the informer). 
 19.   Id. at 618–19 (citing Oberlandesgericht [(“OLG”) the Higher Regional 
Court] July 27, 1949, 5 Suddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 207). 
 20. Id. at 619. 
 21.  Id. 
 22. Id. 
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would have made plain that in punishing the woman a choice 
had to be made between two evils, that of leaving her 
unpunished and that of sacrificing a very precious principle of 
morality endorsed by most legal systems.23 
Accepting the (uniquely German, according to him) sinister character 
of such separation, Hart reminds his readers that reflections by those 
“who have descended into Hell, and, like Ulysses or Dante, brought 
back a message for human beings,”24 could not be “read without 
sympathy.”25  His main reference in this context is Gustav Radbruch, 
who had served as a Minister for Justice in the Weimar Republic and 
as a professor of law in Heidelberg before he was dismissed from that 
position as part of the purges of the legal profession in 1933.26  
In a famous essay published in 1946, Radbruch wrote that legal 
positivism could not, in and of itself, justify the validity of law.27  For 
such justification, recourse must be had to moral values.28  “[L]aw, 
including positive law, cannot be otherwise defined than as a system 
and an institution whose very meaning is to serve justice.”29  A former 
leading legal positivist, Radbruch now poignantly recanted and called 
for a modified return to a natural law legal thinking, having 
concluded that legal positivism was responsible for the conduct of 
jurists during the Nazi era.30  Legal positivism, with its central theory 
that “[a] law is law,” he argued, “has rendered jurists and the people 
alike defenceless [sic] against arbitrary, cruel, or criminal laws, 
however extreme they might be.  In the end, the positivistic theory 
equates law with power; there is law only where there is power.”31  
 
 23.  Id. 
 24. Id. at 615. 
 25. Id. at 617. 
 26. Oren Gross, Hitler’s Willing Law Professors, in THE BETRAYAL OF THE 
HUMANITIES: THE UNIVERSITY DURING THE THIRD REICH (Bernard Levinson & 
Robert Eriksen eds.) (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). 
27.   Gustav Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Laws 
(1946), 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. 
Paulson trans., 2006). 
28.   Id. 
 29. Id. at 7. 
 30. Hart notes that Radbruch’s “appeal to other men to discard the doctrine 
of the separation of law and morals has the special poignancy of a recantation.”  
Hart, supra note 1, at 616.  Others have argued that Radbruch’s pre- and post-
WWII writings “reflect [merely] different aspects of a single position.”  Stanley L. 
Paulson, Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch, and the “Positivist” Theses, 13 L. & 
PHIL. 313, 319 (1994). 
 31. Gustav Radbruch, Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy (1945), 26 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 13 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 
2006); see also Kenneth F. Ledford, Judging German Judges in the Third Reich: 
Excusing and Confronting the Past, in THE LAW IN NAZI GERMANY: IDEOLOGY, 
OPPORTUNISM, AND THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE 161, 172 (Alan E. Steinweis & 
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The German legal tradition of positivism and formalism—which 
rejected any concept of extralegal justice—had thus, according to 
Radbruch, facilitated Nazism.32  Radbruch’s answer, adopted by the 
post-WWII German Grundgesetz (“Basic Law”),33 was the formulation 
of a legal order based on extralegal values.  Law could only be valid if 
its ultimate purpose was “to serve justice.”34  Ronald Dworkin, while 
focusing less on the question of law’s validity, and more on the 
constructive interpretation of “law as integrity,” proposes that judges 
have to assume  
so far as this is possible, that the law is structured by a coherent 
set of principles about justice and fairness and procedural due 
process, and it asks them to enforce these in the fresh cases that 
come before them, so that each person’s situation is fair and just 
according to the same standards.35  
But what then ought to do a judge adjudicating cases in an evil legal 
system such as Nazi Germany?  Dworkin’s invented “Judge 
Siegfried,” finding himself in precisely such circumstances, was, 
therefore, supposed to “ignore legislation and precedent altogether, if 
he can get away with it, or otherwise do the best he can to limit 
injustice through whatever means are available to him,”36 including 
by direct resort to moral considerations. 
At the same time, recognizing that positivism also contributed to 
legal certainty, consistency, and security, which could not be fully 
accomplished by mere reference to an elusive notion of justice, 
Radbruch came up with what has become known as the “Radbruch 
formula”:37  Positive law would be held as valid even when it was 
 
Robert D. Rachlin eds., 2013); Frank Haldmann, Gustav Radbruch vs. Hans 
Kelsen: A Debate on Nazi Law, 18 RATIO JURIS. 162, 162 (2005).  
 32. Radbruch, supra note 27, at 8. 
33.   Rudolf Geiger, The German Border Guard Cases and International 
Human Rights, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 540, 545 (1998). 
 34. Radbruch, supra note 27, at 7; see also Radbruch, supra note 31, at 14 
(“Law is the will to justice . . . . If laws deliberately betray the will to justice—by, 
for example, arbitrarily granting and withholding human rights—then these 
laws lack validity, the people owe them no obedience, and jurists, too, must find 
the courage to deny them legal character . . . . There are principles of law, 
therefore, that are weightier than any legal enactment, so that a law in conflict 
with them is devoid of validity.  These principles are known as natural law or the 
law of reason.”).  
 35. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 243 (1986). 
 36. Id. at 105. 
 37. See Radbruch, supra note 27, at 6–8; Joseph Raz, The Argument from 
Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: 
THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 17, 28–29 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007);   
see also Robert Alexy, A Defence of Radbruch’s Formula, in RECRAFTING THE RULE 
OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 15, 15–16 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999); 
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deemed unjust, unless the contradiction between the law and justice 
reached an “intolerable” level.38  Extreme injustice equals “no law”39 
in the sense that “the statute is not merely ‘false law,’ it lacks 
completely the very nature of law.”40  The Radbruch formula was, 
thus, invoked by the courts of the Federal Republic of Germany and, 
after unification, those of Germany, in dealing with the problem of 
the “grudge informer”41 and with soldiers of the German Democratic 
Republic, who had shot and killed East German citizens who 
attempted to flee to freedom across the Berlin Wall.42 
Radbruch’s basic position could be understood as offering two 
distinct theses.  One thesis, which Stanley Paulson calls the “causal 
thesis,”43 suggests that legal positivism, “as practiced and preached 
in Germany, had . . . [a] causal connection with Hitler’s ascent to 
power.”44  The second, called the “exoneration thesis,” posits that legal 
positivists were “compelled to recognize even the most unjust statute 
as law.”45  Hence, judges (as well as lawyers and law professors) in 
Nazi Germany were not to be held personally liable “for the injustice 
 
Brian Bix, Radbruch's Formula and Conceptual Analysis, 56 AM. J. JURIS. 45, 46 
(2011); see generally CLEA LAAGE, GESETZLICHES UNRECHT: DIE BEDEUTUNG DES 
BEGRIFFS FÜR DIE AUFARBEITUNG VON NS-VERBRECHEN: DIE REZEPTION DER 
RADBRUCHSCHEN FORMEL IN RECHTSPRECHUNG UND RECHTSLEHRE NACH 1945 
(Peter Lang ed., 2014) (discussing the Radbruch formula in its entirety); Douglas 
G. Morris, Accommodating Nazi Tyranny? The Wrong Turn of the Social 
Democratic Legal Philosopher Gustav Radbruch After the War, 34 L. & HIST. REV. 
649 (2016) (same). 
38.  See, e.g., Torben Spaak, Meta-Ethics and Legal Theory: The Case of 
Gustav Radbruch, 28 L. & PHIL. 261, 272–73 (2009). 
 39. DYZENHAUS, supra note 5, at 16. 
 40. Id. at 18 (quoting Radbruch, supra note 27, at 6–7).  For a discussion of 
the Radbruch formula and its use by German courts after the war, see Thomas 
Mertens, Nazism, Legal Positivism and Radbruch’s Thesis on Statutory Injustice, 
14 L. & CRITIQUE 277, 286–95 (2003). 
 41. See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus, The Grudge Informer Case Revisited, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1000 (2008); Thomas Mertens, Radbruch and Hart on the Grudge 
Informer: A Reconsideration, 15 RATIO JURIS. 186 (2002).  
 42. See, e.g., Peter E. Quint, Judging the Past: The Prosecution of East 
German Border Guards and the GDR Chain of Command, 61 REV. POLITICS 303, 
320–24 (1999); Manfred J. Gabriel, Note, Coming to Terms with the East German 
Border Guards Cases, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 375, 403–07 (1999). 
43.   Paulson, supra note 30, at 314. 
 44. Fuller, supra note 1, at 658; HERGET, supra note 9, at 2 (arguing that the 
“unwillingness to inquire into the morality of law by judges, lawyers, and legal 
scholars led to an easy capture of the legal system by the Nazis and facilitated its 
modification to meet evil Nazi goals”).  But see Mark J. Osiel, Dialogue with 
Dictators: Judicial Resistance in Argentina and Brazil, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 481, 
489 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797, 
827 (1993).  
45.   Paulson, supra note 30, at 314, 327. 
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of a sentence based on an unjust statute.”46  This position, which 
extended not only to members of the legal profession but to ordinary 
Germans as well,47 served the political purposes of both post-WWII 
Germany as well as of the Allies.  It enabled the Allies to find “good 
Germans” to govern and run their respective zones of occupation, 
even where those had formerly been aligned with the Nazi state.48   It 
facilitated the decision by the government of Chancellor Adenauer to 
“put the past behind,”49 adopt a clean slate policy, end denazification 
first practically and then, in May 1951, formally,50 and enact amnesty 
laws.  It also allowed former members of the Nazi Party to keep or 
regain positions in the civil service, while the German government 
administered “the sleep cure” to a willing and receptive German 
public.51  It enabled German lawyers, judges, and law professors to 
argue that their engagement with the Nazis “was not . . . a crime of 
 
 46. Id. (citation omitted).  Unlike Radbruch who opposed National Socialism, 
the “exoneration thesis” was adopted after the war mainly as a means of self-
exculpation by former supporters of the Nazi regime.  Id. at 357–59; Helmut 
Kramer, Juristisches Denken als Legitimationsfassade zur Errichtung und 
Stabilisierung autoritärer Systeme, in KONTINUITÄTEN UND ZÄSUREN: 
RECHSTWISSENSCHAFT UND JUSTIZ IM ‘DRITTEN REICH’ UND IN DER NACHKRIEGSZEIT 
141 (Eva Schumann ed., 2008); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: 
Indications from the Fascist Period in France and Germany of Judicial 
Methodology’s Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 101, 151–52 
(2002). 
 47. Radbruch himself noted that legal positivism has rendered jurists “and 
the people alike” defenseless against arbitrary, cruel or criminal laws.  Radbruch, 
supra note 31, at 13.  An editor for a Berlin newspaper covering the Nuremberg 
Trials before the IMT noted that:  
The murderers are right there in the dock.  With every document the 
prosecution produces, another blemish on the soul of the average 
German disappears, and while the gallery, from Göring to Keitel, looks 
black as pitch, the average German looks as pure as a romantic full 
moon over the Heidelberg Castle.  
ANNE SA’ADAH, GERMANY’S SECOND CHANCE: TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND 
DEMOCRATIZATION 156–57 (1998). 
48.   WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND 
MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 410 (2007). 
 49. FREDERICK TAYLOR, EXORCISING HITLER: THE OCCUPATION AND 
DENAZIFICATION OF GERMANY 352 (2011) (quoting Adenauer’s speech to the 
Bundestag on Sept. 20, 1949). 
 50. Id. at 354. 
 51. Id. at 345–83; id. at 351 (“So what did the population of . . . the Federal 
Republic of Germany, feel when it came to confronting the past, almost five years 
after Zero Hour?  The answer was, in most cases, nothing at all.  The country had 
decided to take the sleep cure.”); DAVID ART, THE POLITICS OF THE NAZI PAST IN 
GERMANY AND AUSTRIA 53–55 (2005); NORBERT FREI, ADENAUER’S GERMANY AND 
THE NAZI PAST: THE POLITICS OF AMNESTY AND INTEGRATION 1–91 (Joel Golb trans., 
2002). 
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conviction but rather one of compliance.”52  At the same time, the 
exoneration thesis enabled Western powers to embrace West 
Germany as a key ally against Communist expansionism.  It also 
suggested that the descent to Fascism and Nazism was a unique 
phenomenon that could only be explained against Germany’s 
particular history and traditions of state idolatry and unquestioning 
obedience.53 
Both the causal and the exoneration theses, as well as much of 
the debate about positivism’s role in the shift from the Weimar 
Republic to the Third Reich and during the twelve years of the Nazi 
regime, however, are ahistorical and offer, at best, confusion rather 
than clarity.  While Radbruch’s characterization of the historical 
reality under the Third Reich was adopted wholly uncritically by both 
Hart and Fuller as well as by Anglo-American jurisprudence ever 
since, Radbruch’s assertions reflected a historically distorted view of 
legal experience in both the Weimar Republic and the Nazi state.  
Others, such as Franz Neumann and Ernst Fraenkel, who had been 
on the receiving end of the Nazi horrors and had no less descended 
into hell than Radbruch yet derived precisely the opposite conclusions 
from their and their nation’s experiences,54 were, for the most part, 
ignored by post-WWII legal scholars both in Germany and abroad. 
III.  LAW, MORALITY, AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM 
Fuller’s argument that “in the seventy-five years before the Nazi 
regime the positivistic philosophy had achieved in Germany a 
 
 52. Clara Maier, The Weimar Origins of the West German Rechtsstaat, 
1919—1969, 62 HIST. J. 1069, 1075 (2019); see also LENA FOLJANTY, RECHT ODER 
GESETZ: JURISTISCHE IDENTITÄT UND AUTORITÄT IN DEN NATURRECHTSDEBATTEN 
DER NACHKRIEGSZEIT 35–36 (2013).  See also Konrad H. Jarausch, The 
Conundrum of Complicity: German Professionals and the Final Solution, in THE 
LAW IN NAZI GERMANY: IDEOLOGY, OPPORTUNISM, AND THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE 
26–27 (Alan E. Steinweis & Robert D. Rachlin eds., 2013), noting that the Federal 
Republic of Germany (“FRG”) and the German Democratic Republic (“GDR”)  
adopted competing versions of anti-Fascism, with the GDR 
emphasizing the Third Reich’s structural roots in the landed and 
business elites, and the FRG instead stressing the criminal disposition 
of the Nazi leadership.  Ironically, both interpretations opened the door 
to exculpation, since the former ignored the question of individual guilt 
while the latter held only a small minority responsible, thereby 
absolving the majority of accomplices.  
 53. See, e.g., WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN, FROM LUTHER TO HITLER: 
THE HISTORY OF FASCIST-NAZI PHILOSOPHY (1941); SIR ROBERT VANSITTART, BLACK 
RECORD: GERMANS PAST AND PRESENT (1941). 
54.   Douglas G. Morris, Write and Resist: Ernst Fraenkel and Franz Neumann 
on the Role of Natural Law in Fighting Nazi Tyranny, in NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 
197, 199 (2015) (stating that Fraenkel and Neumann departed from legal 
positivism). 
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standing such as it enjoyed in no other country”55 was supported by 
Radbruch, who had earlier commented that legal positivism “almost 
unchallenged, held sway over German jurists for many decades.”56  It 
is not surprising, then, that after the War, the American Military 
Government attempted to reform German legal education and the 
perspectives of legal practitioners away from legal positivism and 
towards greater appreciation of law’s role in the service of higher 
values.57  
However, legal positivism was not, in fact, the dominant theory 
in Germany prior to the Nazi seizure of power.  Quite the opposite.  
As Rottleuthner comments, “[o]ne could group together those authors 
who called themselves at that time ‘positivists.’  Besides Hans Kelsen, 
however, there would not be many.  When one says ‘positivist’—one 
means most often the Others.”58  Rather than constituting a sharp 
break with Germany’s past, the anti-positivist attitude of the post-
WWII era and the concomitant “renaissance of natural law”59 
corresponded both with the Weimar period and, paradoxically and 
disturbingly, with the law under National Socialism.  The bitter irony 
is that the revival of natural law thinking in post-WWII Germany and 
its combination with the myth of positivism and the defenseless 
lawyers led to figures, such as Hans Kelsen, who actually opposed 
National Socialism and was one of its many victims, being castigated 
as facilitators of Nazism.60  
The rejection of the Weimar Republic, certainly by Germany’s 
elite, was shared by most members of Germany’s legal community 
who, for their part, acted diligently to undermine the edifice of the 
Republic and its laws.61  Law professors, judges, and lawyers 
incessantly challenged the Weimarian authority.62  Two main tools 
which they deployed to do so were the notion of rights that existed 
 
 55. Fuller, supra note 1, at 658. 
 56. Radbruch, supra note 27, at 1.  
 57. EDITH RAIM, JUSTIZ ZWISCHEN DIKTATUR UND DEMOKRATIE: 
WIEDERAUFBAU UND AHNDUNG VON NS-VERBRECHEN IN WESTDEUTSCHLAND 1945–
1949, 336–42 (2013). 
 58. Hubert Rottleuthner, Legal Positivism and National Socialism: A 
Contribution to a Theory of Legal Development, 12 GER. L.J. 100, 102 (2011).  
Rottleuthner also argues that “[p]ositivism as a philosophy or theory of 
law . . . was by no means the dominant perspective during the Weimar period, 
and also not in the public law theory.”  Id. at 106. 
 59. Stephan Kirste, Natural Law in Germany in the 20th Century, in 12 A 
TREATISE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE 91, 92 (Enrico 
Pattaro & Corrado Roversi eds., 2016); see also FOLJANTY, supra note 52, at 4–6. 
 60. See FOLJANTY, supra note 52, at 38–39. 
 61. See Mertens, supra note 40, at 282–84. 
 62. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 72 
(2d ed. 1986). 
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outside, indeed above, the constitution, and judicial review.  Against 
what legal professionals, mostly coming from the conservative middle 
and upper classes, considered to be Weimar’s positivist and formalist 
bend, they argued that the law ought to be construed in light of a set 
of extralegal rights.63  The legal order is founded on, and legitimated 
by, that nebulous set of rights and values that exist outside of positive 
law.  Superimposed on such notions of extra (indeed supra-) legal 
rights was the introduction of judicial review by the Reichgericht.64  
In the absence of any formal, positivist law pertaining to judicial 
review, the court derived that power from a principle of “good faith 
and trust,” which itself existed “outside of any positive-legal norm.”65  
The law in itself was not sacred and would always be subject to the 
demands of justice.  Since judges were the only ones who “serve[d] 
justice alone,” theirs was to be the final word.66  The potent 
combination of extralegal rights and judicial review enabled the 
judiciary, whose members were mostly appointed from within the 
conservative middle and upper classes,67 to challenge and resist the 
“possibility that the popular legislature would transform the liberal 
Rechtsstaat into a social Rechtsstaat through the right of judges—in 
their overwhelming majority from the ruling class—to review the 
laws.”68  Thus, antiformalistic, antipositivistic attitudes allowed 
highly conservative judges, lawyers, and law professors to challenge 
and undermine the legal structures of the Republic.69  As one 
commentator has noted, “the conceptualizations of the Rechtsstaat 
from the Weimar period show a decisive mistrust towards the 
democratic process of government.  Indeed, they exhibit an 
impatience with the fluctuation and constant change of government 
under popular sovereignty.”70  Thus, “[t]he same judges who applied 
 
 63. See CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 163 (8th ed. 1993).  
 64. Bernd J. Hartmann, Das richterliche Prüfungsrecht unter der Weimarer 
Reichsverfassung, in 8 JAHRBUCH DER JURISTISCHEN ZEITGESCHICHTE 154 (2007).  
 65. Maier, supra note 52, at 1086. 
 66. Id.  
 67. INGO MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 6–7 
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991).  See generally Ernst Fraenkel, Zur 
Soziologie der Klassenjustiz, in 1 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN: RECHT UND POLITIK IN 
DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK 177 (Hubertus Buchstein ed., 1999) (discussing the role 
and place of capitalist values in the education of German judges). 
 68. Hermann Heller, Rechtsstaat or Dictatorship?, 16 ECON. & SOC’Y 127, 
131 (Ellen Kennedy trans., 1987); see Peter Caldwell, Legal Positivism and 
Weimar Democracy, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 273, 275–76 (1994).   
 69. See Curran, supra note 46, at 152–53. 
 70. Maier, supra note 52, at 1090. 
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eugenic laws after 1933 had not felt compelled by their sense of 
loyalty to the Weimar government to apply the laws of the republic.”71   
In contradistinction, during the Weimar years the proponents of 
legal positivism, rather than their adversaries, were the ones who 
attempted valiantly to defend the Republic and democracy and who 
ultimately refused to support the new regime that came to power in 
1933.72  Indeed, as post-WWII literature has undermined the causal 
link between “Weimar legal positivism” and the rise of National 
Socialism, a growing number of scholars began to identify the culprit 
not with positivism but rather with positions, such as those advocated 
by the Free Law school that challenged positivism during the Weimar 
years.73 
There is another and more significant problem with blaming 
legal positivism for the failure of German law professors, judges, and 
lawyers to oppose the Nazi regime.  The Nazis themselves called for 
the unification of law and morality, a stance in direct opposition to 
the positivist worldview which, so they argued, was reflected in the 
Weimar Republic and upheld by its advocates.74  For National 
Socialists, the separation between law and morality was a “mere 
liberal prejudice.”75  The law, as an overtly political tool, was to be 
 
 71. Markus Dirk Dubber, Judicial Positivism and Hitler’s Injustice, 93 
COLUMBIA L. REV. 1807, 1824 (1993) (reviewing MÜLLER, supra note 67); see also 
FRANZ L. NEUMANN, Deutsche Demokratie, in WIRTSCHAFT, STAAT, DEMORKATIE 
AUFSÄTZE 1930–1954, at 327, 333 (1978); Paulson, supra note 30, at 353–55. 
 72. See Eric Hilgendorf, Rechtsphilosophie Zwischen 1860 und 1960, in 
HANDBUCH RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 160, 165 (Eric Hilgendorf & Jan C. Joerden eds., 
2017) (“The main theoretical opponent of all Nazi legal philosophers was legal 
positivism, whose representatives (especially Kelsen and Radbruch) were 
expelled from Germany or at least silenced immediately after the seizure of 
power.”) (translation by author); Caldwell, supra note 68, at 278.  As Caldwell 
argues: “[A]s long as the Weimar Constitution remained in force, legal positivism 
served, not as a handmaiden of fascism, but as a bulwark against it in theoretical 
discussions, and a guarantee that social forces had access to the process of state 
will-formation.”  Id.; see also Paulson, supra note 30, at 345–48. 
 73. See Okko Behrends, Von der Freirechtsbewegung zum konkreten 
Ordnungs–und Gestaltungsdenken, in RECHT UND JUSTIZ IM “DRITTEN REICH” 34 
(Ralf Dreier & Wolfgang Sellert eds., 1989); Stephen J. Lubben, Chief Justice 
Traynor’s Contract Jurisprudence and the Free Law Dilemma: Nazism, the 
Judiciary, and California’s Contract Law, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 81, 82, 98–
100 (1998); Curran, supra note 46, at 158–66.  
 74. Caldwell, supra note 68, at 276–77.  Caldwell writes that, “[f]ar from 
excluding natural law from judicial practice, the Nazis developed a kind of 
secular, biological ‘natural law’ of race and nation . . . .”  Id. 
 75. GUSTAV RADBRUCH, Strafrechtsreform und Nationalsozialismus, in 9 
STRAFRECHTSREFORM 331, 334 (Rudolf Wassermann ed., 1992) (“National 
Socialism calls for a new understanding of the relationship between law and 
morality.  The separation of law and morality, this great feat of the philosophy of 
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established, validated, construed, and applied within the four corners 
of the community of the people (“Volksgemeinschaft”), whose will was 
revealed and mediated by the will of the Führer in accordance with 
the Führer principle in the Führer state.76  Nazi legal theorists had 
made the claim that law must conform to a substantive concept of 
justice reflected in the values of National Socialism, calling for the 
elimination of the distinction between law and (Nazi) morality.  
Positivism was castigated as responsible for the “ethical 
disorientation” of Germany under the Weimar Republic,77 and as a 
theory manifesting “spiritual alienation,”78 separating law from its 
connectedness to “national [i.e., German] mores.”79  Rather than 
maintain the gap between law and morality, legislators and 
adjudicators must be guided by the völkisch idea of the law (“völkische 
Rechtsidee”) and by the spirit of the people (“Völksgeist”).80  Such 
ethical disorientation was inherent not only in positivism’s 
association with liberalism and its value-neutrality, but also in its 
promotion of decadent individualism at the expense of the ethnically 
homogeneous German Volk.  As Carl Schmitt declared, “[t]he spirit of 
the German people had long resisted the liberal ‘Ideas of 1789’ and 
their disintegration of order thinking.”81  
National Socialism embraced the antipositivist ideologies of 
German Romanticism that far preceded the rise of Nazism.82  Carl 
 
German idealism, is for the National Socialists a mere liberalistic prejudice (ein 
bloßes liberalistisches Vorurteil).”) (translation by author). 
76.  Curran, supra note 46, at 174:  
The idea that the leader would be ineffably, synecdochically fused with 
his people, and henceforth would define the will of the people through 
his decisions, involves an inevitable abandonment of deference to that 
very will . . . . [T]he Führer was to define the Volk, and not vice versa. 
 77. ERNST FORSTHOFF, DER TOTALE STAAT 13 (1934); see Herlinde Pauer-
Studer, Kelsen’s Legal Positivism and the Challenge of Nazi Law, in 17 EUROPEAN 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE – PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN EUROPE AND THE VIENNESE 
HERITAGE 237 (Maria Carla Galavotti et al. eds., 2014) (providing translation of 
“ethical disorientation”). 
 78. KARL LARENZ, DEUTSCHE RECHTSERNEUERUNG UND RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 
11 (1934) (translation by author).  
 79. Id. at 12 (translation by author). 
 80. KAI AMBOS, NATIONAL SOCIALIST CRIMINAL LAW: CONTINUITY AND 
RADICALIZATION 65 (Margaret Hiley trans., 2019). 
 81. CARL SCHMITT, ON THE THREE TYPES OF JURISTIC THOUGHT 77 (Joseph W. 
Bendersky trans., 2004); see also KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER, GERMANY’S NEW 
CONSERVATISM: ITS HISTORY AND DILEMMA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 47–69 
(1957); Curran, supra note 46, at 167 (noting that “[a]nti-individualism in 
repudiation of Weimar legal values was a common thread of Nazi legal writing”). 
 82. Desmond Manderson, Two Turns of the Screw, in THE HART-FULLER 
DEBATE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 197, 212–13 (Peter Cane ed., 2010); 
Walter Ott & Franziska Buob, Did Legal Positivism Render German Jurists 
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Schmitt celebrated the end of the era of legal positivism while Karl 
Larenz argued that, “[a]ccording to the German view, law [was] . . .  a 
live order closely connected with the moral and religious life of the 
community.”83  Morality was not left as a matter for individuals as 
such, but rather it was a matter for the whole community to whom 
individuals were subservient.  It was with the mores of the Volk, with 
the “healthy popular sentiment” (“gesundes Volksempfinden”) of the 
German people, that all positive legal norms must align and 
comport.84  In turn, the people’s justice and mores were irrefutably 
encapsulated in, and reflected through, the will of the Führer.85  Since 
der Führer hat immer recht, everything he wished became law.86   
At the same time, the intrinsic link between Führer and Volk 
allowed Nazi ideologues to deny claims that the former’s will 
amounted to nothing more than rank arbitrariness, since the Führer’s 
decisions were seen as but an expression and reflection of the 
communal will of the Volk.87  Thus, it was possible for Koellreutter to 
proclaim that “the National Socialist Rechtsstaat is a just state as well 
 
Defenceless During the Third Reich?, 2 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 91, 98 (1993); Curran, 
supra note 46, at 151; Manfred Walther, Hat der Juristische Positivismus die 
Deutschen Juristen im ‘Dritten Reich’ Wehrlos Gemacht?, in RECHT UND JUSTIZ IM 
“DRITTEN REICH,” supra note 73, at 336–37. 
 83. LARENZ, supra note 78, at 5 (translation by author). 
 84. See Hubert Rottleuthner, Volksgeist, gesundes Volksempfinden und 
Demoskopie, 2 KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR GESETZGEBUNG UND 
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 20, 23–24 (1987); AMBOS, supra note 80, at 45.  On the use 
of the term gesundes Volksempfinden in German criminal law under National 
Socialism see, e.g., John P. Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic 
Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1073, 1102 (1961); Caldwell, supra note 68, at 
276. 
 85. Curran, supra note 46, at 174 (“The idea that the leader would be 
ineffably, synecdochically fused with his people, and henceforth would define the 
will of the people through his decisions, involves an inevitable abandonment of 
deference to that very will . . . the Führer was to define the Volk, and not vice 
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 86. As Radbruch notes in the second of his Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy:  
[A]rbitrariness, breach of contract, and illegality—provided only that 
they benefit the people—are law.  Practically speaking, this means that 
whatever state authorities deem to be of benefit to the people is law, 
including every despotic whim and caprice, punishment unsanctioned 
by statute or judicial decision, the lawless murder of the sick. . . . [I]t 
was the equating of the law with supposed or ostensible benefits to the 
people that transformed a Rechtsstaat into an outlaw state.  
 No, this tenet does not mean: Everything that benefits the people is 
law.  Rather, it is the other way around: Only what law is benefits the 
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Radbruch, supra note 31, at 13–14. 
 87. FRANZ NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL 
SOCIALISM 1933–1944, at 83 (1942).  
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as an order-based one.”88  For him, as for many of his colleagues, the 
National Socialist Rechtsstaat was the purest form of Rechtsstaat and 
it stood in opposition to a state of positive laws (“Gesetzesstaat”) that 
was represented by Weimar.89  After 1933,  
[i]nstead of [positivism’s] value-blindness we find the most 
abundant adjuration of law and justice by the legal 
philosophers, an ecstasy of values in face of the German legal 
state of Adolf Hitler.  Instead of defenselessness we find efforts 
to ingratiate themselves in the form of declarations of 
loyalty . . . . Instead of defenselessness, one should rather speak 
of lack of contradiction—on the ground of inclination, 
agreement or “to prevent something worse.”90   
Indeed, “[t]he fusion of law and morality serve[d] the NS-jurists as a 
welcome means to extend the authority and power of the Nazi 
regime.”91  Such ethicization of law, fusing it together with and 
indistinguishably from morality, meant that the former could not 
exist independent of the latter.92  National Socialism rejected 
positivism and, instead, embraced its own unique and particularistic, 
distorted and depraved, variant of “irrational and communal Natural 
Law, founded in biology.”93 
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The SS Judge Konrad Morgen, 3 JURIS. 367, 373 (2012) (discussing the “blurring 
of the distinction between law and morality” and its impact on the Nazi regime). 
 92. AMBOS, supra note 80, at 62 (“[T]he aim was an anti-positivist 
(substantive) justification of the law charged with ethicising, völkisch ideals—
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a metaphysical, being- and life-oriented conceptualisation [sic] . . . .”).  For a brief 
overview of the claims that justice has substantive content as given by National 
Socialism, see id. at 63. 
 93. ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF 
DICTATORSHIP 134 (E. A. Shils et al., trans., 2006); Curran, supra note 46, at 171 
(“Nazism adopted natural law principles in theorizing an absolute and 
immutable character to biologically determined attributes.  It rejected natural 
law principles, however, in denying human-wide universality.”).  See also AMBOS, 
supra note 80, at 64–65 (observing that National Socialism’s understanding of 
natural law was “charged with racist, völkisch ideas and oriented towards the 
will of the Führer (which is itself equated with the law).”). 
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Even in areas where the statutory terrain after 1933 has not 
changed from that which existed before the rise of National Socialism 
to power, the courts “were always ready to disregard any statute, even 
those enacted by the Nazis themselves, if this suited their 
convenience or if they feared that a lawyer-like interpretation might 
incur displeasure ‘above.’”94  Thus, for example, the entrenched 
understanding of the German Civil Code’s notion of legal capacity 
entailed that it could not be lost, except by death.  While the relevant 
provision of the Civil Code was neither amended nor repealed by the 
Nazis, legal scholars were quick to opine that the traditional 
understanding of legal capacity was out of touch with the spirit of the 
Volk and that such legal capacity was the exclusive province of 
members of the German Volk.95  Jews and other non-Aryans could 
not, therefore, have any legal capacity under the law.96  The judiciary 
followed suit with delegalization (“Entrechtlichung”), analogizing 
Jews to the dead, and as such not enjoying legal capacity.97  Through 
the judicial concept of the “civil death” of Jews, the Civil Code “could 
be nazified without needing to be repealed.”98   
Similarly, legal scholars and the German courts were able to 
abuse open-ended legal terms such as “good faith,” “honor,” or “good 
morals” as well as broad and ambiguous criminal offenses such as 
“criminal malicious mischief” and construed them in line with the 
spirit of National Socialism.99  Here, too, they were following 
 
 94. Fuller, supra note 1, at 652. 
95.   Curran, supra note 46, at 169–70. 
 96. Id. at 170. 
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 99. AMBOS, supra note 80, at 65 (footnotes omitted): 
For Schaffstein, the “broad definition of crimes” that raises concerns 
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the NS Weltanschauung is called for, the end to the “enslavement by 
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See also Hilgendorf, supra note 72, at 165 (citations omitted) (translation by 
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flexible and its binding nature abolished.  Unclear concepts such as 
“concrete orderly thinking” served as a new source of law.  Pompous 
empty formulas and supposedly “deep” phrases replaced clear terms 
and stringent arguments; 
Raphael Gross, Guilt, Shame, Anger, Indignation: Nazi Law and Nazi Morals, in 
THE LAW IN NAZI GERMANY: IDEOLOGY, OPPORTUNISM, AND THE PERVERSION OF 
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guideposts laid down by German legal scholars and judges during the 
interwar years, rejecting the dictates of formalism and positivism 
where those clashed with notions of justice.100   
Law professors and judges alike followed a two-track strategy: “If 
one were dealing with ‘prerevolutionary’ laws, then the rigors of 
positivism did not prevail; if one were dealing with National-Socialist 
laws, then the judge had to obey, even when the laws were flagrantly 
unjust.”101  In this way, they operated under a combination of a 
perverted natural law thinking, with respect to the former, and a 
perverted legal positivism, with respect to the latter.102  It is thus that 
the pronouncement by the Federal Constitutional Court 
(“Bundesverfassungsgericht”) in a 1958 case that the Basic Law did 
not establish a value neutral order but rather “’an objective order of 
values with its section on basic rights’” and that all laws had to be 
“’interpreted in its spirit,’”103 standing alone, could have been 
authored, without a single change, by the courts of the Third Reich.  
At the end of the day, it was not inattention to values that marred the 
post-WWII reputation of the German legal profession, but it was 
rather devotion to a base and odious set of values.104 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
National Socialism benefitted from a perfect storm of legal 
theory.  While legal positivists were, by and large, supportive of the 
Weimar Republic and democracy, they had been “unable to 
respond”105 effectively when the constitutional order crumbled and 
the Nazi Party seized power.  Moreover, positivism then “permitted 
lawyers to rationalize to themselves and others their interpretation 
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and application of laws they might, upon reflection, have considered 
to be grotesquely unjust or immoral.”106  It was the antipositivists, 
however, who hailed the unity of law and morality who undermined 
the foundations of the Weimar constitution by “grant[ing] legitimacy 
to the judiciary and president as they usurped power from the 
Reichstag.”107  Furthermore, once the Nazis seized power, the same 
jurists were quick to tie the law to the mast of Nazi morality.  Thus, 
in the words of Rottleuthner:  
It would be naïve to appeal to natural law against the Nazis, 
realizing that the Nazis had their own natural law . . . . It would 
be naïve to speak of the Rechtsstaat as a guarantee against 
injustice without taking into consideration what the Nazis 
meant by the “Rechtsstaat Adolf Hitlers . . . .” We can learn from 
the Nazi era that everything can be justified.108 
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